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A large portion of electoral irregularities in developing countries stem from administrative 
deficiencies, rather than deliberate fraud. This is particularly evident when it comes to voter 
registration and identification: the quality of a voter list depends from the existence of effective 
mechanisms to register and identify citizens and electors, which might not be easily at hand in many 
developing countries. Democratization in these countries has been accompanied by intense polemics 
about the quality of the voter rolls and the identification of electors, which have threatened democratic 
consolidation. Biometrics technology has been recently heralded as a possible solution, but its 
effective potential is disputable. In order to understand how problems with registering and identifying 
voters have affected democratization, this paper reviews the contrasting experiences of Côte d’Ivoire 
and Ghana. In Côte d’Ivoire, the problem of the reliability of the voter register has been entangled 
since the ‘90s with the politicization of the citizenship question. As a consequence, compiling an 
acceptable voter register has proven extremely difficult and cumbersome. In Ghana, an effective 
electoral administration has been key to overcome the mistrust of the political parties about the 
fairness of the voter process.  
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Elections are both “the supreme political act and a routine administrative exercise”.1 There is a 
broad consensus in the academia and among the general public that elections are a necessary 
condition for a country to be considered democratic. There is also consensus about the fact that not 
all elections are the same: they can be conducted in a way that ensures that citizens’ preferences are 
duly taken into account, or they can be deeply flawed. Certain standards should be respected, in 
order for an election to be considered ‘free and fair’.  
 Some of these standards, however, are of a technical and administrative, rather than political 
or legal, nature. Representative democracy is predicated over the existence of a state that it is able 
to carry efficiently the administrative aspects of the electoral process. Lack of ‘infrastructural 
power’ of the state complicates the process of holding elections and, by consequence, the 
consolidation of democracy. While there is a growing interest in political science for ‘election 
quality’ or ‘electoral integrity’,2 the attention has concentrated on deliberate breaches of electoral 
rules by politicians wishing to retain or to gain power.3 Arguably, however, a large portion of 
electoral irregularities in developing countries stem from administrative deficiencies, rather than 
from actors’ willingness to manipulate the rules.  
 In particular, voter registration and identification are the most administratively complex and 
cumbersome component of an electoral process. The holding of democratic elections requires that a 
state is able to compile a reliable voter list. It also implies that electors can identify themselves in 
front of the polling station staff, usually by showing voter cards or national IDs.  
 In many parts of the developing world, the capacity of states to develop accurate registration 
and identification systems is in scarce supply. Sub-Saharan Africa is a case in point. In a number of 
countries, the unreliability of voter registers has raised serious polemics about the fairness of the 
electoral process. Problems with voter registration stem from the weakness of other mechanisms to 
identify citizens and cannot thus be easily redressed. A number of solutions have been 
experimented in recent years, particularly the introduction of computerized biometrics, but their 
impact is disputed.  
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 In order to understand the impact of administrative deficiencies on the process of 
democratization and how countries have overcome them – or failed to – this article discusses the 
experiences of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. The article demonstrates that some of the problems that 
the two countries have faced in terms of democratic consolidation have been directly related to their 
deficient registration and identification systems. It then discusses some factors that explain the 
relative success of Ghana in comparison to Côte d’Ivoire, such as the politicization of the 
citizenship question in Côte d’Ivoire and the role of the electoral administration.     
 
Democracy, administrative capacity and identification 
Registration techniques and technologies are a key components of the ‘infrastructural power’ of the 
state,4 which can be defined as “the capacity of the state to penetrate society, regulate social 
relations, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined way”.5 Infrastructural 
power is distinct from ‘despotic’ or ‘coercive’ power. While systems of registration may become 
tools for state oppression, a state that is able to record and register its citizens is a precondition for 
the enjoyment of citizenship and of democratic rights.6  
 Effective voter registration is a case in point. The quality of a voter list affects the quality of 
elections and, in turn, democracy itself. A voter roll can be assessed for its comprehensiveness – the 
proportion of eligible voters included – its currency – the extent to which information is updated – 
and its accuracy – the rate of error in names, addresses, gender the date of birth.7 Many current 
assessment tools of electoral integrity incorporate indicators of the fairness of voter registration.8  
 Producing a good quality voter roll, however, requires substantial technical and 
organizational skills. Many Western states have established the administrative capacity necessary to 
register and identify their citizens before introducing universal suffrage. As a consequence, their 
arrangements for voter registration capitalise on the existence of other administrative resources, by 
extracting, for instance, the voter list from the civil register and using national ID cards for 
identifying voters. This system, however, demands not only that the civil register is accurate, but 
also a high level of trust in state institutions. Even when the civil and voter register are kept 
separated, the task of updating the register can be facilitated by the sharing of information with 
other state departments, when good records already exist.9  
 On the other hand, voter registration poses particular challenges in those parts of the world 
where states struggle to collect reliable data about their citizens,10 such as in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
These countries have typically deficient systems of civil registration and large sections of the 
population that do not hold identity documents. The rate of birth registration – usually the easiest 
vital statistic to collect – is a good proxy to assess the registering capacities of Sub-Saharan African 
states (Table). Although there are important country variations, estimates provide a picture of 
general failure.  
 As a consequence of their lack of state capacities, these countries face what have been called 
“second-order problems” of electoral integrity.11 These problems should not be underestimated. 
From the point of view of individual citizens, for instance electors wrongly excluded from the voter 
roll, the non-intentionality of breaches to electoral integrity might matter less than the denial of 
their rights. Moreover, the boundary between the political and the technical when it comes to 
elections is thin and electoral integrity is very much a matter of perceptions.12  In countries where 
trust between political actors is low and democracy is still fragile, technical insufficiencies can be 
easily politicized. Losing parties often claim fraud when technical irregularities have happened, 
whether because they misinterpret the situation or because they are trying to delegitimize the 
winner. In the most serious cases, violent contestation of electoral results can follow. But even 
when electoral violence is absent, the lack of trust in the electoral process can slowly undermine 
support for democracy itself.  
 On the other hand, low infrastructural power also facilitates the perpetration of actual 
electoral fraud.13 For instance, in the absence of adequate mechanisms for identifying eligible 
voters and detecting double registration, political parties may have an easy job in inflating the 
register with minors, foreigners or electors already registered. The issue of fraud in voter 
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registration has become all the more prominent as international coverage of elections and electoral 
observation have reduced the scope for the most blatant forms of electoral fraud.14  
 As a consequence, in many developing countries, the issue of how to make voter registration 
‘safer’ has become a prominent one.15 Opposition parties and civil society organizations have often 
been the most vocals in contesting existing voter rolls. However, incumbents have also pushed for 
reforming voter registration, in the hope of reinforcing their legitimacy in case of a new victory. 
International organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
European Union (EU) and the International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES) have also been 
powerful agenda setters behind the modernization of voter registration.16  
 In the last few years, the adoption of computerized biometric technology, particularly 
Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS), has featured particularly high in voter 
registration reform. The biometric industry in Sub-Saharan Africa has boomed, passing from 87.7 
million USD in 2005 to 415.8 million USD in 2010, a growth per year of 37%, higher than in any 
other world region.17 Much of this growth can be attributed to projects aiming at improving 
identification for general purposes, voter registration or both. Indeed, no less than twenty-four Sub-
Saharan countries have already held elections with biometric registers (Table).  
 Arguably, the popularity of biometrics is linked to the fact that introducing a new voting-
related technology is easy compared to the long-term task of creating a reliable civil registration and 
identification system. However, while it can help with detecting double registration, biometrics 
cannot address the problem of the comprehensiveness of a voter list, nor help with telling who has 
the right to citizenship and who is a foreigner, and who has reached the age of voting and who is 
still a minor.18 Countries where national IDs and the civil register have limited coverage have been 
forced to establish special procedures to allow those who do not carry documents to register, 
particularly through some form of oral testimony.  
 In addition, while it narrows the space for certain forms of fraud, the adoption of 
Information Technology (IT) in elections might offer other opportunities to manipulate the electoral 
process, by placing “critical components of the process in a ‘black box’” and making the 
observation of the voter registration process more difficult.19 This is all the more true as bids 
surrounding the provision of technology are not always awarded in a transparent manner.  
 A final problem with improving voter registration and identification is the blurred line 
between legitimate practices and fraud. A trade off between the accuracy and the inclusiveness of a 
voter list is to some extent inevitable.20 However, calls for for introducing more stringent 
requirements for being registered as a voter might be themselves a cover to disenfranchise 
potentially hostile voters. They are, in this regards, similar to legislative and administrative 
practices that, although presented as neutral, aim to restrict access to citizenship.21 Such a 
disenfranchisement, although conducted under the clout of the law, constitutes a substantial 
violation of democratic rights.    
 
Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana compared 
I now turn to at how, in practice, lack of ‘registering capacities’ and problems with voter 
registration have affected the consolidation of democracy in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana. The two 
West African countries are easily amenable to a paired comparison. They are neighbours and share 
a similar geographical and climatic context. Their economy is based on a similar basket of natural 
resources, especially agricultural goods exported to the global market, such as cocoa and coffee. 
The two countries are ethnically and religiously diverse, with a large share of the population 
belonging to the Akan linguistic and ethnic family. Both face a geographical and ethnic North-
South divide, with a prevalently Muslim and relatively poorer North and a prevalently Christian and 
more prosperous South. Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana have a considerable population of foreign origin, 
who migrated from neighbouring countries attracted by the opportunities offered by cocoa farming.  
Since independence, however, the political history of the two countries has sharply 
diverged. Ghana’s first ruler Kwame Nkrumah chose to embrace a variety of African socialism as 
his official ideology, but the experiment was short-lived, ending in a military coup and a long 
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period of political instability and economic regression. In the same years, under the firm grip of his 
first ruler Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Côte d’Ivoire, an openly capitalist and pro-Western country, 
remained stable and achieved record rates of economic growth. However, since the 1980s, the two 
countries have experienced a sharp reversal in fortunes.22 After the military coup of Jerry Rawlings 
in 1979, Ghana’s economy started to recover, while Côte d’Ivoire’s economy showed signs of 
weakness.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, the two countries have initiated a parallel process of political 
liberalization. However, while political opening has resulted in Ghana in the establishment of a 
democratic system, in Côte d’Ivoire the transition to democracy quickly stalled. The country 
experienced increasing political and ethno-regional tensions that culminated in the outbreak of a 
civil war in 2002 and in the subsequent occupation of the North of the country by the New Forces 
(NF) insurgents. After renewed crisis following the contested results of the 2010 presidential 
election, the country seems to have only recently embarked on the road to recovery.   
Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana inherited from colonization and autocratic rule a deficient 
registration and identification system. The first ‘third wave’ multi-party elections were 
controversial and the voter roll and the identification of voters posed particular problems. A number 
of efforts have since then been made in both countries to improve identification and voter 
registration and ease political tension, including the introduction of biometrics in Côte d’Ivoire’s 
2010 presidential elections and Ghana’s 2012 presidential elections. However, while in Ghana 
innovations have been effective at generating trust in the electoral process, in Côte d’Ivoire political 
tensions have persisted and have been a significant factor behind the 2002 civil war. The process of 
post-conflict transition has eventually resulted in the elaboration of a voter roll accepted by all the 
parties but the list is in several respects still problematic. 
The next two paragraphs review Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana’s experiences with voter 
registration, before discussing more in depth some factors behind Ghana’s relative success and Côte 
d’Ivoire’s failure.   
 Voter registration and identification in Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d’Ivoire’s civil registration system was created in colonial time23 but was extended to the 
whole territory only by the Félix Houphouët-Boigny regime.24 A National Identity Card was 
created in the early post-independence years but never achieved universal coverage. The rate of 
birth registration remained low, being estimated as late as in 2000 at 71.8%.25 More worryingly, the 
status of the very large population of foreign origin was blurred. Houphouët-Boigny and his Parti 
Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) encouraged foreigners to settle in Côte d’Ivoire and even 
granted them the right to vote. As they did not risk deportation, many foreigners did not feel the 
urgency to apply for Ivorian citizenship, while others were able to obtain Ivorian identity 
documents outside the regular naturalization procedures. 
 However, the massive influx of foreigners, as well as of planters coming from other regions 
of Côte d’Ivoire , in the cocoa-producing areas of the South West of the country, caused tensions 
with the autochthonous population of these areas. These tensions were worsened by uncertain rules 
surrounding the access to land. The discontent of the ‘autochtonous’ culminated in a local armed 
revolt in 1970 that, although rapidly put down, was indicative of problems that were going to 
resurface in the ‘90s, in a context of economic crisis.26  
 The issue of the inscription of foreigners on the voter roll became a prominent one after the 
first multi-party elections in 1990. The elections were hold with a new consolidated list, exploiting 
data that the Institut National de la Statistique (INS) had collected in 1988 on the occasion of the 
general census.27 The regime granted the right to vote to foreigners “already registered”,28 a 
decision that was contested by Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), the 
main opposition party, which had its stronghold in the South West. However, the fact that the 
president was reconfirmed with 81.7% of the votes suggests that he might have won even without 
the ‘foreign vote’.  
9 
 The politicization of the citizenship question knew a further escalation with the death of 
Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 and the raise of a new opposition party, the Rassemblement des 
Républicains (RDR), which received the support of former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. The 
RDR was popular among second-generation immigrants and Northern Ivorians, culturally close to 
Burkinabe and Malians, and Ouattara was accused by his rivals of being himself of Burkinabé 
origin.29 Aiming at preventing Ouattara from standing in elections, Houphouët-Boigny’s successor 
Henri Konan Bédié promoted the divisive concept of ivoirité. The discourse of ivoirité tended to 
establish a distinction between ‘true Ivorians’ and Northerners, with the latter assimilated to 
immigrants.30  
 In view of the 1995 elections, the Ivorian government made a substantial effort to respond to 
criticism about the voter list, which was however not sufficient to satisfy the opposition.31 The INS 
revised the list, extracting this time those who were identified as foreigners from it,32 and fully 
computerized it. However, given Côte d’Ivoire’s deficient civil registration system, some foreigners 
were likely still able to vote. Furthermore, government and opposition were divided also about 
other issues, such as the nomination of an independent electoral commission and a controversial 
new electoral code, which stated that candidates to the presidency should be born by parents born 
Ivorians. The code was perceived by the RDR as an attempt to prevent Ouattara from running. 
Eventually, the RDR and the FPI launched a violent boycott of the 1995 elections, which 
reconfirmed Bédié, but in conditions of dubious legitimacy.33  
 In the following years, claims that foreigners had falsified or irregularly obtained birth 
certificates and national IDs and had used them to unduly register to vote resurfaced. The FPI broke 
its tactical alliance with Ouattara and embraced itself a xenophobic rhetoric, claiming to defend the 
rights of ‘true’ Ivorians, de facto identified with the autochthonous populations of the South 
Western region. An attempt was made to introduce new national IDs with security features, but the 
FPI claimed that foreigners had been able to obtain them illegally.34 On the other hand, the RDR 
was concerned with the possible exclusion of voters as a consequence of misguided attempts to 
‘clean’ the roll and to deliver IDs only to ‘authentic’ Ivorians.35 This fear intensified after the 
election of Gbagbo to the presidency in a contested poll in 2000, where Ouattara was again 
prevented from standing. The new regime launched a controversial process of identification of the 
population.36 Northern Ivoirians’ feeling of being stripped of their citizenship rights was a major 
factor behind the 2002 rebellion of the NF, which casted Côte d’Ivoire into a prolonged period of 
territorial division and political paralysis.  
 In 2007, following the initiative Gbagbo and NF leader Guillaume Soro themselves, the 
Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA)37 was concluded. Some observers qualified the 
agreement of “monumental shift” in the peace process,38 although doubts that were going to prove 
well-founded persisted about the good faith of the Ivorian parties in concluding it.39 The agreement 
paved the way to post-conflict elections and provided for a joint voter registration and identification 
process, with the aim to address the identification problems that had empoisoned Côte d’Ivoire’s 
political climate.  
 A preliminary phase was envisaged for reconstructing the civil registries damaged or 
destroyed during the war. Citizens who did not hold a birth certificate had the possibility to be 
delivered one by presenting witnesses in front of mobile court judges, through the so-called 
audience foraines. However, the provisional voter roll was not only to be cleaned from doubles 
using biometric technology but also cross-checked with the 2000 electoral list and with a series of 
‘historical registries’ of the Ivorian state, in order to establish beyond any doubt the citizen status of 
the potential electors.40 Moreover, in order to reassure the former conflict parties, the responsibility 
for the process was split among different actors. The INS was retained for technical expertise but 
the direction and supervision role was given to a new Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). 
Two additional bodies were in charge of the identification process for general purpose.41 French 
enterprise SAGEM was awarded the tender to produce new biometric IDs. There were polemics 
about how SAGEM had been selected and external donors refused to bear a major financial share of 
the joint voter registration-identification process.42 External partners remained however involved, 
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as the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) was in charge to certify all 
stages of the electoral process.43  
 The joint process of identification and registration was launched on September 2008 and 
was long and chaotic. Instead of lasting 45 days, as originally planned, the collection of data 
extended up to nine months, among interruptions and resumptions.44 It was however with the 
processing of the biometric data in October 2009 that a major issue came out. 1 033 985 people 
whose names could neither be found in the 2000 list and in the historical registries nor identified as 
doubles or foreigners were excluded from the provisional voter list, hence labeled White List. A 
Grey List was created for gearing their case.45 In an attempt to determine the status of at least some 
of the people on the Grey List, Robert Beugré Mambé, president of the IEC, instructed its staff to 
carry a new cross checking using additional official registries. However, he was accused by 
Gbagbo’s supporters to have mismanaged the process and forced to resign in February 2010.46 
Eventually, a compromise was found with the nomination of a new IEC president and the 
inscription of about 400 000 people into the White List. The process resulted into the inscription on 
the final voter roll and the delivery of elector cards and national IDs to 5,725,722 Ivoirians.47  
 The list was certified by the UN SRSG and consensus about it made eventually possible the 
holding of post-conflict presidential elections in October and November 2010. However, the refusal 
of Gbagbo to acknowledge his defeat, as well as the ensuing conflict between the IEC and the 
Constitutional Council, loyal to the outgoing president, plunged the country into a renewed crisis, 
which resulted into the death of about 3000 people.48 In the end, thus, while the compilation of a 
voter list accepted by all the conflict participants was a necessary prerequisite for holding elections, 
it was per se unable to guarantee the acceptance of election results.  
 Also in view of this, and of the exorbitant cost of the process, several observers have 
questioned the outcome of the Ivorian joint voter registration and identification process. In spite of 
the long and complicate procedure, the Ivorian voter roll has several serious shortcomings. 
Following INS estimates, the list would have covered less than 73 % of the potential voting 
population in 2010.49 Arguably, the Grey List still contains many electors unduly excluded from the 
vote. Moreover, in spite of having been used also for the 2011 legislative elections and the 2013 
local elections, the list has no update mechanism and many new majors have as a consequence been 
excluded from the vote.50 
 Thus, although polemics about the presence of foreigners on the voter list have for the 
moment ceased, Côte d’Ivoire seems to have not found a satisfactory solution with its problem with 
registering and recognizing electors.  
 
Voter registration and identification in Ghana  
Ghana transitioned to democratic politics with an even weaker system of identification and 
registration of the population than Côte d’Ivoire. The country’s vital registration system covered 
only about 40% of births in 198851 and a project of introduction of a national ID card in 1970 had 
been interrupted before reaching national coverage.52   
 In Ghana, like in Côte d’Ivoire, the issue of voter registration has become prominent with 
the first multi-party election in 1992. The election, which former military ruler Jerry Rawlings won 
with a large margin, was hotly contested and the voter register was a cause of particular concern.53 
Many voters could not present identity documents and were admitted to vote on a mere self-
attestation. The New Patriotic Party (NPP), Rawling’s main opponent, published a pamphlet 
entitled The Stolen Verdict,54 where it claimed that the voter roll, which had initially been compiled 
for the District Assembly elections of 1988 and subsequently updated, contained two million ‘ghost 
voters’, who had been key to ensure Rawlings’ victory. An ad hoc mission by IFES acknowledged 
the bloating of the voter roll, but concluded that it was due to technical and organizational 
shortcomings, rather than deliberate rigging, and that it had not substantially affected the result.55 
Nonetheless, the refusal of the opposition to accept the verdict and its decision to boycott the 
subsequent parliamentary polls constituted a serious threat to the process of democratization. 
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 Ghana managed to overcome criticism in the short term thanks to the support of donors, 
particularly USAID and by IFES, which became strongly involved in the 1996 electoral process,56 
and the installation in 1993 of an independent and permanent Electoral Commission (EC).57 The EC 
proceeded to compile a new voter register in October 1995, introducing two significant innovations: 
Optical Recognition Technology (OMR), which was used to facilitate the consolidation and 
computerization of the list and voter IDs with pictures, which made identification of voters easier. 
A special procedure was envisaged for people unable to present a birth certificate: they had to 
present two witnesses and, in case of contestation, their application was reviewed by a District 
Registration Review Committee.58 Another important move of the EC was the creation of the Inter 
Party Advisory Committee (IPAC), a loosely formalized body comprising representatives of 
political parties and of the EC, which provided a forum for political parties to engage in a dialogue 
with the EC and air their grievances.59  
 The new system was employed without major changes until the 2012 presidential elections. 
At the beginning, the EC’s effort appeared successful at generating confidence in the electoral 
process by political parties and the general public. The 1996 elections were unanimously heralded 
as free and fair60 and, in 2000, Ghana crossed another step in its process of democratic 
consolidation with the peaceful transfer of power from Rawling’s National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) to the NPP.61   
 However, concerns about the bloating of the voter register periodically resurfaced. In 2000, 
the EC itself admitted that the voter register contained about 1.5 million of ‘ghost voters’.62 Given 
the low quality of the pictures on the voter cards, there was a risk that people could vote more than 
once, using the names of voters that had died or had moved. Registration of minors and foreigners 
was also a problem.63 Suspects that the NPP and the NDC were encouraging double voting or 
irregular registration, particularly in their respective strongholds, the Ashanti and Volta regions, 
were persistent.64 The EC periodically tried to ‘clean’ the register, but was unable to identify all the 
voters who had died or moved to another district.    
 The 2008 elections, however, came as a watershed and convinced the Ghanaian EC that a 
new major reform of the voter registration process was needed. The election was extremely tight 
and the final difference in votes among the two main candidates was minimal: less than 50,000 
votes over 9 million votes casted. The voter roll was particularly controversial. The EC was 
expecting to update it by adding about 800 000 people: instead, 1.8 million turned out. 65 The 
Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) conducted a specific mission to observe the 
registration process and concluded that it had been marred by violence and irregularities.66 The 
Ashanti and Volta regions showed suspiciously high registration rates and voter turnout.67 
 Initially, the EC hoped that a breakthrough would have come from the implementation of 
Ghana’s parallel process of biometric identification. The process, started in 2008, was supposed to 
result in the delivery of national IDs with biometric features to all citizens aged more than 15, 
which should have been also employable to identify voters. However, the National Identification 
Agency, which lacked the human and financial resources of the EC, started soon to have problems 
of funding and, since December 2008, the process has de facto come to a halt.68  
 Against this backdrop, the EC decided to carry its own project of biometric registration. In 
what has probably been the most ambitious experiment up to date with biometrics in an African 
election, the EC aimed not only at employing biometric to vet and de-duplicate the data, but also for 
the verification of the identity of voters at polling stations, which was to be performed by scanning 
the voters’ fingers with verification machines. This solution was particularly appropriate to deal 
with issues of multiple registration and impersonation.  
 The registration of voters, carried in 2012, a few months ahead of presidential elections, was 
fairly successful. 14 060 573 people were registered in only 40 days. The provisional list was then 
put on display and a number of voters were subtracted or added following objections on the list, 
leading to a final electoral list including 14 031 793 people.69 Perhaps more importantly, the 
process received a positive assessment by the general public.  According to a survey conducted by 
CODEO among Ghanaian registered to vote, 78% of respondents agreed the biometric registration 
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represented an improvement with respect to the old system and 87% of respondents considered it a 
useful tool for promoting credible and peaceful elections.70 
 The implementation of the new biometric verification system on election day experienced 
however certain technical difficulties. The EC insisted before the elections that no one would be 
allowed to vote without their identity being verified biometrically.71 However, biometric machines 
failed at some point during voting at 19% of polling stations and the EC was forced to extend the 
voting of one day.72 The NPP filled a complaint, which has now been rejected, at the Ghanaian 
Supreme Court. It alleged among other things that some polling station officials had resorted to 
double standards, allowing some electors to vote without biometric verification.73 
 In the end, although polemics about the voter register have been a recurrent feature of post-
democratization Ghana, the country has been able to overcome them fairly well and to avoid that 
they jeopardize democratization. Although some observers have pointed out at the recent NPP 
complaint in order to argue that elections have become more controversial,74 contestation has not 
turned violent. Parties have resorted to the existing legal mechanisms and, in fact, the complaint 
appears to have reinforced the legitimacy of the biometric system.  It must be also pointed out that 
the Ghanaian voter register is currently considered one of the most reliable databases of the country. 
It has found an application in a number of non-electoral domains, such as the banking and education 
system, thus generating additional benefits.75  
 
Ghana’s success and Côte d’Ivoire’s failure discussed 
Why has Ghana been able to compensate for its deficit in ‘infrastructural power’, while in Côte 
d’Ivoire polemics about voter registration and identification have continued to empoison the 
democratic debate for a long time? I discuss below some of the factors that explain Ghana’s relative 
success with respect to Côte d’Ivoire. Some pertain to the more general political context, such as 
the politicization of the citizenship question in Côte d’Ivoire but not in Ghana. Others revolve 
around the electoral process itself, such as the role of the electoral administration, and the gradualist 
approach to technological innovation in Ghana.             
 
The citizenship question and its politicization 
Countries that inherit a deficient civil registration system and where many people do not hold 
identity documents have to strike a balance between inclusivity and accuracy when compiling their 
voter rolls. Finding a solution to this dilemma is a particularly thorny issue, because it exposes the 
subtle line between acceptable administrative practices and legally sanctioned violation of 
democratic rights. In particular, a political consensus has to be found on the nationality of 
applicants: a more relaxed system will probably be unable to avoid that some foreigners register, 
but a more rigid system will run the opposite risk of excluding citizens from the vote.  
 Although both in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire there have been justified concern that some 
foreigners were able to enroll, Ghana has not experienced a politicization of the citizenship question 
comparable to Côte d’Ivoire. In spite of the presence of a considerable migrant population, several 
issues have prevented Ghana from embarking on the same path. First, there is not an equivalent 
land tenure problem in Ghana, as the autochthonous population of the cocoa producing areas has 
been able to negotiate the access of migrants to land on favourable terms.76 Second, Ghana’s 
community of foreign origin mobilized early for its rights and obtained the legal recognition of 
citizenship before democratization. Free elections have further benefited second generation 
migrants, as they have regularly sanctioned political actors that appeared unfavourable to them.77 
Thus, Ghanaian stakeholders have accepted that the nationality of the applicant could be established 
through the statement of witnesses, while in Côte d’Ivoire the FPI’s obsession with the presence of 
foreigners on the voter list has led in 2010 to the establishment of extra mechanisms to verify the 
nationality of applicants. However, because these mechanisms have arguably been unable to 
capture all Ivorian citizens, many potential voters have been excluded from the roll.   
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 In retrospective, coupling the processes of identification and voter registration for the 2010 
post-conflict elections seems to have contributed in Côte d’Ivoire to the extreme politicization of 
the process.78 It shall also be noticed, however, that in Ghana, the opposite choice to keep the two 
processes separate has resulted in a duplication of financial efforts. Had Ghana been able to 
complete the process of introduction of the new biometric ID card, it could have enhanced voter 
identification without changing its system of voter registration.79  
 
The role of the electoral administration  
The importance of an autonomous electoral management body for new democracies has been often 
acknowledged.80 In Côte d’Ivoire, because of, among others, French colonial heritage and lack of 
political negotiations on electoral governance,81 the first multi-party elections were held under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Interior.82 The current IEC, which oversaw the process of biometric 
voter registration, has enjoyed more autonomy, but has other deficiencies that have affected its 
capacity to register voters effectively. It has been created as an ‘ad hoc’ and temporary institution as 
the result of peace negotiations. It is a plethoric political body, composed by representatives of 
parties and former rebel movements, which initially had little or no experience at administering an 
election. The participation of other four structures to the joint voter registration and identification 
process has been an additional source of inefficiencies and delays.83  
 In Ghana, the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) that supervised voter 
registration for the 1992 elections was also accused of partiality. The 1993 Electoral Commission 
Act, however, contains detailed provisions aiming at securing the independence and autonomy of 
the EC.84 In contrast to Côte d’Ivoire’s IEC, Ghanaian EC members are permanently appointed 
civil servants, not political representatives. They regard themselves as professionals of elections and 
have accumulated a substantial amount of technical knowledge through time.85 At critical junctures, 
such as the controversial 2008 election, perceptions of the public that, whatever the problems with 
the voter register, the EC was sincerely committed to organizing free and fair elections, has been 
key in repelling the risk of electoral violence.86 The existence of the IPAC, moreover, has allowed 
political parties to voice their concerns without hijacking the electoral administration. Indeed, the 
disputes that have followed the 2012 election have been attributed to the EC failure to properly 
involve the IPAC, in contrast with previous elections.87   
 Contrasting Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana suggests that autonomy and professionalism are both 
necessary conditions for effective electoral governance. The Ghanaian EC has been successful 
because it embodies both qualities. In Côte d’Ivoire the INS enjoyed technical expertise, but was 
seen as a government-controlled organization by the opposition and was thus unable to play a 
similar role. 
 
The approach to introduction of technology 
The professionalism of the Ghanaian EC has also shaped the way the country has approached the 
issue of technological innovation. Differently than in other developing countries, the Ghanaian 
voter register has evolved gradually.88 At the beginning, the EC relied on the technical and financial 
assistance of donors, but has become progressively more autonomous. OMR was chosen because it 
had already been used in the education system, and many poll officials, who were local teachers, 
were familiar with it. The EC first adopted Polaroid cameras, then substituted then with digital 
cameras. The adoption of biometrics was a meditated decision and the Ghanaian EC wanted to 
make the most of the new technology. The tender process was strict, with 47 companies screened 
before the decision to award the bid to STL/HSB/Genkey company.89  
 At the beginning of the ‘90s, due to the efforts of the INS to improve the voter registration 
process in a sustainable way, Côte d’Ivoire seemed embarked on the same path as Ghana. However, 
the political crisis has interrupted the process of technical learning. The 2007-2010 voter 
registration and identification process was planned in a context of post-conflict elections, in 
substantial discontinuity with the previous voter registration exercises. Paradoxically, instead of 
contributing to make the process more consensual, new technologies have generated suspicions and 
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mistrust.90 The attribution of the tender to French enterprise SAGEM has been particularly 
controversial, as many in Côte d’Ivoire thought that corruption and political considerations – 
president Gbagbo was trying to improve his relationships with France – had played a role in the 
choice.  
 A cause of concern in both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire is the cost of registration, which 
biometrics has contributed to increase. Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 election has been regarded as one of 
the most expensive ever held.91 Because of the continuous delays, the cost of voter registration 
levitated: according to IEC and UNDP estimates, the expenses amounted in the end to about 312 
million USD.92 Most of this sum was absorbed by the SAGEM contract, which increased with 
respect to the initial bid and reached 266 million USD. In Ghana, although the process has been 
more cost-effective, the financial burden has not ceased to grow since the ‘90s.93 The 2012 
biometric exercise has cost about 149 million CEDI, or 53 million USD,94 although, in positive, the 
Ghanaian authorities were able to sustain the expenses without direct donor contributions.95 
  
Conclusion  
The quality of an election is determined not only by the deliberate will of political actors to abide 
the rules or to fraud, but also by the infrastructural capacities of the state. Registration and 
identification techniques and technologies are a component of state capacities that has a particularly 
strong impact on elections, as from them depends the compilation of a comprehensive and accurate 
voter list and the identification of people entitled to vote. At the beginning of their process of 
democratization, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire faced similar challenges. Ghana has responded by 
instituting an independent and professional electoral administration, which has experimented with a 
series of technical innovations in order to make the electoral process safer. On the other hand, in 
Côte d’Ivoire, the politicization of the citizenship question and the subsequent descent of the 
country into political turmoil have prevented the elaboration of a voter list accepted by all political 
parties. The current voter and population rolls, although a consensus has been found on them, still 
exclude a considerable number of citizens. The paradox of voter registration is that a good voter 
register is necessary to generate trust in the electoral process, but the elaboration of a good quality 
register requires trust in the electoral administration and a relatively consensual political climate. 
Côte d’Ivoire has been dragged into a vicious circle, while in Ghana the role of the EC has been 
fundamental in overcoming both political and technical challenges.  
A considerable, although underestimated risk, is also that ‘safer’ registration systems may 
trade accuracy and currency for comprehensiveness, resulting in the legal disfranchisement of 
voters. In Côte d’Ivoire, the system implemented in 2010 has led to the exclusion of many potential 
voters.  
 During their last voter registration exercise, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have both tried to 
make their voter list more reliable by introducing biometrics. However, their example show that 
technology in elections is not a magic stick, but its impact is mediated by the political and 
institutional context. Moreover, technology cannot really address problems such as the registration 
of foreigners or minors. A long-term solution to these issues could only come from a long-term 
work of reinforcement and modernization of the civil registration and identification system. 
Unfortunately, governments and donors alike seem up to now to have paid more attention to short 
term considerations linked to electoral deadlines. The ill-fated experience of Ghana with national 
identification shows that synergies are not duly exploited.  
On the other hand, although voter registration is in most of the cases non-compulsory, in 
countries where most citizens do not hold a national ID, it is often the easiest way for citizens to 
obtain an identity document. Thus, the voter registration process itself can be perceived as a part of 
the process of statebuilding and of reinforcement of the infrastructural reach of the state.96  
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